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ABSTRACT 
The article discusses varieties of naturalism and the fundamental disagreement about reductionism 
versus perspectivism. The central part of the article focuses on Andrej Ule’s idea about experiential 
perspective and the possibility of naturalizing the mind. I must confess I am not able to pin down all 
his suggestions about how to accommodate experiential perspectivity in nature, but I certainly find his 
ideas thought-provoking and inspiring. 
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Andrej Ule poses a question about the possibility of naturalizing the mind, more precisely, 
he “examines whether it is possible to provide a coherent naturalist account of the 
emergence of the mind (spirit), construed as a plethora of mental abilities that are present in 
living beings” [2; p.501]. I would first like to shed light on two understandings of naturalism, 
ontological and methodological, and then point out the fundamental disagreement about 
reductionism versus perspectivism. The central part of the paper will focus on Ule’s idea 
about experiential perspective. 
The question about the possibility of naturalizing the mind immediately opens two further 
questions: what do we mean by “naturalizing” and what do we mean by “mind”. In this article, 
I will leave the question about the mind aside and take a common sense understanding of the 
mind as a faculty of a person by which one feels, perceives, thinks, reasons, wills, remembers, 
desires, imagines etc. I think such understanding of the mind is compatible with the one 
provided in Ule’s article “Some Reflections on the Possibility of Naturalizing the Mind” [2], 
although he is giving a more precise analysis of the three related notions of consciousness, 
mind and spirit in his paper “Consciousness, mind, and spirit: three levels of human 
cognition” [3]. So, in order to prepare the ground let us first look at the notion of naturalism. 
NATURALISM 
Naturalism is a philosophical position based on considerations of American philosophers from 
the first half of the 20
th
 century who aimed to “ally philosophy more closely to science” [4]. 
For example, John Dewy in Experience and Nature [5] argues against dualism and for the 
continuity of mind and nature. He provides his problem-solving account of intelligence with a 
naturalistic foundation that combines biology and psychology. At the same time, Dewey 
argues for the importance of experience and active engagement with the nature, stressing that 
knowing and thinking about the world do not exhaust human contact with the world – a point 
which bears special relevance for our discussion. 
Although different philosophers interpret the term naturalism in different ways, there is now a 
common agreement that naturalism can be separated into two components: the ontological 
and the methodological. According to David Papineau, “the ontological component is 
concerned with the contents of reality, asserting that reality has no place for ‘supernatural’ or 
other ‘spooky’ kinds of entity. By contrast, the methodological component is concerned with 
ways of investigating reality, and claims some kind of general authority for the scientific 
method” [4]. An interesting and more detailed classification of different possible positions is 
provided by John Shook [6]. He views naturalism as “a philosophical worldview that relies 
upon experience, reason, and especially science for developing an understanding of reality … 
[and maintains] that these three modes of understanding together shall control our notion of 
reality” [6; p.1]. This “triadic unity” thus filters out supernaturalism [6; p.1]. Because 
essential factors of experience, reason, and science can be coherently related in numerous 
ways, varieties of naturalism may be distinguished along three dimensions: the degree of 
ontological confidence given to science; the breadth of explanatory discretion given to 
science; and the number of scientific fields permitted to describe reality [6; p.1]. This results 
in 27 logically possible combinations of which some are incoherent, so 7 viable varieties of 
naturalism are left: Eliminative Physicalism, Reductive Physicalism, Exclusivist Liberal 
Physicalism, Non-Reductive Physicalism, Exclusivist Liberal Pluralism, Perspectival 
Pluralism and Synoptic Pluralism. According to Shook, all these viable alternatives gravitate to 




Pluralism [6; p.15]. He suggests that the main issue is fundamental disagreement about 
reductionism versus perspectivism: “Does any science’s knowledge, and the reality it knows, 
have priority (epistemic and ontological) over all other knowledge and experience?” [6; p.16]. 
The Basic Idea of naturalism – “that we are natural creatures in a natural world” – is often 
taken as saying that “we must fit humans in austere scientific image of the world” [7; p.29] 
and thus of favoring Eliminative Physicalism and Reductive Physicalism. Advocates of the 
former (e.g. Paul Churchland, [8]) suggest that many concepts referring to mental states and 
processes are just illusions without real reference, while a reductionist, for example the 
famous neuroscientist Francis Crick, would claim that “the scientific belief is that our minds 
– the behavior of our brains – can be explained by the interaction of nerve cells (and other 
cells) and the molecules associated with them” [9; p.7]. 
It is clear that such approaches have difficulties with accommodating subjective, first-person 
perspective. So let us look more in detail into Ule’s analysis of the experiential perspective 
and his proposal to accommodate it in nature. 
TAKING AN EXPERIENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
In his article “Mind in physical reality, its potentiality and actuality” Ule argues for the 
irreducibility of the experiential perspective. He condensed his view about the experiental 
perspective in the following thesis [1; pp.176-179]: 
T9: For a living being, taking a distinctive experiential perspective means 
ordering all its feelings in accord with itself felt as in the “middle” of its feeling. 
T10: This implies a distinct sensitivity to spatiotemporal patterns of occurrences. 
It can be realized by any being which is sensitive to different potentialities of 
events and processes in themselves and around them, and direct its motion in 
line with its perception of spatiotemporal patterns of occurrences, even without 
any explicit concept or explicit idea of space and time. 
T11: My own experiential perspective cannot be translated or reduced to the 
impersonal or the third-person perspective. 
T12: I suppose that the human ability to take a certain kind of the experiential 
perspective is based on our inborn dispositions for emotional and affective 
supported ways of drawing distinctions between ourselves and other people, 
and for imaginative anticipation of the reaction of other “objects” to our 
behavior. The primary and then secondary socialization of children then 
transforms and enlarges the basic ways humans relate to themselves. 
T13: Reality (nature) includes a kind of “perspectivity dimension” or, to be 
more precise, the possibility of natural beings obtaining the experiential form 
of their “like to be X”. 
T14: Taking a qualia level of the experiential perspective is the necessary 
condition for an organism to be sensitive to the higher-order processual 
potentialities within it and in its surroundings and to feel its place in the 
referential system of possible processes. 
Ule’s notion of experiential perspective necessitates the existence of qualia, so it seems that 
the experiential perspective also provides an answer to the question of phenomenal 
consciousness posed by David Chalmers [10] and Thomas Nagel [11]. In “Facing Up the 
Problem of Consciousness” Chalmers starts with the following observation: “Consciousness 
poses the most baffling problems in the science of the mind. There is nothing that we know 
more intimately than conscious experience, but there is nothing that is harder to explain. All 
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sorts of mental phenomena have yielded to scientific investigation in recent years, but 
consciousness has stubbornly resisted” [10; p.200]. Or, as Nagel’s pots it, “the fact that an 
organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that there is something it is like to 
be that organism” [11; p.166]. Ule hopes that his proposal may be a good candidate for a 
heuristic hypothesis in finding a solution to the “hard” problem. 
At a first glance, it seems that Ule has found a solution to both troubles, the subjective 
perspective and the qualitative aspect. Unfortunately, questions appear when we pursue the 
matter in greater detail. It is hard to understand what role is “perspectivity dimension” 
supposed to play in Ule’s overall account. Ule seems to construe it as a “useful and 
suggestive metaphor of the trans-objective possibility of taking an experiential perspective 
for all entities in the spatiotemporal reality (which I call “nature”). [...] it is reasonable to 
assume that at least some living beings in the world share the same possibility of “moving” 
(developing) in the “direction” of the perspectivity dimension. They may actualize, according 
to this hypothesis, the possibility of taking the experiential perspective without necessarily 
doing so.” [1; p.184]. 
It is also not clear how experiential perspective emerges in the world (cf. Vörös [13] on the 
problem of the origins). As Ule himself acknowledges “it is impossible to describe, explain or 
comprehend any point of view from a no-point-of-view. But how can we then explain the 
coming into existence of living creatures having their points of view i.e., living creatures that 
for them it is somehow significant that they are and in what way they are?” [1; p.183] It is 
suggested that, in the case of nonliving matter there exist “protoqualias levels of experiental 
perspectivity” [1; p.185], but at the same time Ule says that his hypothesis is not a variant of 
panpsychism [1; p.185]. It is hard to imagine how these two claims can be coherent. 
I will conclude this short discussion with Ule’s interesting hypothesis that “a mentally and 
linguistically articulated experiential perspective entails (among other things) an implicit 
utilization of an unlimited potential for logical operations on propositions (thoughts)” [2; p.509] 
that suggests an answer to the question of grasping propositions and thoughts in the space of 
logical operations. If this hypothesis is eventually vindicated, Ule promises to provide an 
explanation that many naturalist are looking for. 
There seems to be a considerable inconsistency at work in Ule’s paper: on the one hand, he 
argues that the experiential perspective is irreducible, but on the other hand, he is also 
suggesting that his hypothesis is better in naturalizing the mind then other closely related 
attempts (i.e. Bateson, Peirce and biosemioticists) that he critically examined. I must confess 
I am not able to pin down all his suggestions about how to accommodate experiential 
perspectivity in nature, but I certainly find his ideas thought-provoking and inspiring.  
CONCLUSION 
In his recent work [1-3], Ule is pointing to the experiential perspective as a crucial feature for 
understanding conscious (and also unconscious) organisms in nature. It seems obvious that 
the scientistic approach to nature has no means to accommodate it properly. This results in a 
number of problems. Teed Rockwell in Neither Brain nor Ghost [12] provides a similar 
diagnosis as to why it so often seems that the object of contemplation is an unconscious 
thing: “When I contemplate an item, whether organism or machine, from the objective third-
person point of view, it will, by the very nature of that perspective, seem like an object, an 
unconscious thing. But that doesn't mean that what I am contemplating is not conscious from 
its own point of view. Objectivity makes everything appear to be an object, including entities 
with subjective points of view. This is what accounts for both the illusion of solipsism and 




and go back to the mind-body dualism or embrace some version of a scientifically 
problematic panpsychism? One way out this unpleasant dilemma could be a different 
conception of the Basic Idea of Naturalism – “that we are natural creatures in a natural 
world”. Instead of the above mentioned understanding – “we must fit humans in austere 
scientific image of the world” [7; p.29], McArthur proposed we understand it as saying “the 
world is everything that is the case” [7; p.45]. According to him, such an approach qualifies 
as a form of naturalism because it holds that “our understanding of the world and ourselves 
ought to be consistent with the findings of the natural sciences” [7; p.45]. Moreover, such 
understanding is able to accommodate normative facts into the natural world. It can also be 
viewed as a form of Perspectival Pluralism where experience and scientific knowledge 
present multiple perspectives upon the same reality and where sciences are not able to explain 
the mind fully. “The first-person situated and subjective perspective of consciousness is 
neither inexplicable nor incongruent with the third-person objective knowledge of the 
sciences, since all experience and knowledge is embedded in situated contexts. Our mental 
lives are correlated to some degree with nervous processes, scientific knowledge grows from 
our careful observations of the world, and our experiences of the world can be usefully 
coordinated with scientific knowledge.” [7, p.12] This is a position close to Dewy and 
American pragmatists. It is not without its own difficulties, of which the main one is probably 
the question of possible contradictions between some aspect of experience and some part of 
scientific knowledge. It is also not the only attempt to broaden the view about nature and try 
rethink the mind–nature relation. For a somehow similar attempts to naturalize 
phenomenology and phenomenologize nature see Vörös [13] and Kordeš [14] in this issue. 
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